Update 85 hrs

I have chosen my topic and I am working on a thesis statement. Here is my proposal so far:


Seminar 1 Original Argument: Coherentism
The coherence theory of justification is a highly debated alternative to foundationalist theories of the same sort. It denies some of the basic tenets of foundationalism, such as the existence of basic beliefs, and instead tries to show how a system of beliefs could be justified by the system's internal coherence alone. Many opponents have strongly objected to this theory but one type of objection seems to be most commonly used. This is the isolation objection to Coherentism. The objection generally can include many different parts. Yet, three main types of the isolation objection can be distinguished from each other though they are usually interrelated. I will now discuss the three versions of the isolation objection and then lay out a sketch of a possible argument in defense of the coherence theory which will be the central argument of my eventual thesis.
The first type of isolation objection is called the Alternative Coherent Systems Objection. It says that a coherence theory of justification claims that any system of beliefs constituting knowledge can only be justified by internal coherence. This makes it impossible for there to be one uniquely justified system of beliefs simply by appealing to coherence. If all one needs for a system of beliefs to be justified is for them to be coherent, then any number of systems (if not an infinite number) could be found as equally coherent though they may be incompatible with each other. Thus there can be no choice between any of these systems on the basis of coherence which is not arbitrary. And because each is equally justified we end up in skepticism about truth. One system of beliefs may be justified including belief X; another is equally justified including belief ~X. Thus we are no closer to the truth because both X and ~X can be justified, so coherence can only commit us to skepticism.
The second type of isolation objection is called the Input Objection. This objection states that coherence is only a matter of internal relations between the beliefs in a belief system. There is no connection or reliance on anything external to the system. An entire system of beliefs might be justified and even constitute knowledge, but nothing about coherence causes it to be in contact with the outside world it supposedly describes. No coherence theory requires that there be any input from the world that causally influences a system of beliefs. Thus if the beliefs in a coherent system were to match up with the world it could only be accidental. Accidental truth of beliefs cannot constitute justification or knowledge.
The third type of isolation objection is the Problem of Truth. A basic part of all epistemological theories of justification is that they must show themselves to be truth-conducive. The objection states that a coherence theory of justification cannot accomplish this task without also committing any proponents to a coherence theory of truth and idealist metaphysics. These theories taken together create the only way coherence can match up with truth. I won't go into this now for times sake, but the problem is that these two theories are often seen as extremely unsatisfactory and untenable, thus a theory that commits one to other untenable theories is itself highly unsatisfactory.

Now that I have laid out the three basic forms of the isolation objection I will follow Laurence Bonjour in pointing out that answering the second objection, the input objection, is crucial to answering the isolation objection as a whole. A coherentist account that accommodated a requirement for some kind of external world input would have a much higher probability of getting at truth and knowledge. I now can make my thesis clear. I want to claim and will show that there are coherence theories of justification that can accommodate a requirement for input from the external world while not falling into foundationalism, thus surviving at least this form of the isolation objection.

My primary argument
1.If there are coherence theories of justification that require input from the external world then the input objection fails.
2.There are coherence theories of justification that require input from the external world.
3.Thus, the input objection fails.

Secondary argument
1.If the input objection fails and a coherence theory of justification requires input from the external world then there is a possibility for a coherence theory of justification to be truth-conducive.
2.If there is a possibility for a coherence theory of justification to be truth-conducive then the isolation objection as a whole can be answered.
3.The input objection fails and a coherence theory of justification requires input from the external world. (From primary argument)
4.Thus, there is a possibility for a coherence theory of justification to be truth-conducive.
5.Thus, the isolation objection as a whole can be answered.


What I now need to do is to show that there are coherence theories of justification that require input from the external world, then how exactly this requirement causes the input objection to fail, and how this input requirement is truth-conducive. Lastly I need to show how truth conduciveness is crucial to a coherence theory surviving the whole isolation objection. In the end if I can come up with or show a mechanism of some sort that connects external world input with coherence and truth then there can be at least a minimal answer to the input objection with some inkling of a direction toward answering the whole isolation objection.


Let me know what you think.
Kyle